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The State of International Humanitarian Law
as a Consequence of the History




South Slavs have been repeatedly used as precedents for international humani-
tarian law and consequently have affected global developments: from the in-
ternational concern over positions of Christians in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 
1870s that led to the peaceful replacement of imperial rule to the late 20th cen-
tury in the NATO intervention against Serbia and Montenegro over Kosovo 
Albanians, which led to the creation of the newest nation-state in Europe. In 
addition to internal factors, the very creation of the common South Slav state 
was a result of international interventions, as was the dissolution of the coun-
try. The League of Nations ruling in favour of the Yugoslav complaint against 
Hungary in 1934 aided in developing the UN Security Council resolutions 
against Afghanistan in September 2001. Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995 was a 
precedent for the UN sanctioned intervention, while Kosovo was a precedent 
for the non-sanctioned American-led intervention. Afghanistan, East Timor, 
Iraq, Libya are all legal consequences of interventions in the Balkans. There-
fore, local history of interventions can lead to a general understanding of the 
development of international humanitarian law.
Keywords: Yugoslavia, International Intervention, Humanitarian Law, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Kosovo
Introduction
The origins of the Yugoslav state are interconnected with the development of inter-
national interventionist policies. The rise of an idea of humanitarian intervention 
that gradually resulted in a restricted notion of sovereignty coincided with the crea-
tion of the common state of South Slavs, as well as its demise. 
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Some authors wrongly describe Yugoslavia as a ‘creation of Versailles’. For 
instance, on the website that is self-described as ‘a Modern World History GCSE 
revision site’ exactly this is claimed by simplifying the facts and misleading whole 
generations of British high school graduates (GCSE, 2012). This was stated on the 
website: ‘Yugoslavia was formed by giving Serbia land from the old Austrian Em-
pire (St Germain) and from Hungary (Trianon)’ (Ibid.), naming two of the post-war 
treaties and ignoring the simple fact that ‘by the time the Conference convened in 
Paris in January 1919, the Serbo-Croat-Slovene kingdom was formed in Belgrade 
on 1 December 1918’ (Djokić, 2009).
However, it is often claimed in political and even academic circles in the suc-
cessor states of Yugoslavia that it was ‘a creation of Versailles’. One could prima-
rily find this kind of argument in Croatian public debates; but, since the 1990s, it 
was not uncommon to come across such claims in Montenegrin and Bosnian dis-
cussions. ‘During the dissolution of Yugoslavia’, Ivan Lovrenović observed about 
nationalist authors, ‘the loudest argument of those wishing its end was: it cannot 
survive because it was artificial state, creation of Versailles...’ (Lovrenović, 2008). 
Dejan Djokić observed that ‘another oft-repeated error is that the Versailles Treaty 
created Yugoslavia (and Czechoslovakia)’. The victorious powers, in fact, as Djokić 
stated, ‘did not oppose the unification of a Yugoslavia, which to them seemed a 
logical union of ethnically closely related peoples’ (Djokić, 2009). This is a clear 
historical view of the creation of the state. Thus, the creation of Yugoslavia was a 
product of internal forces as well as the will of South Slav elites. The people’s will 
was never checked as the referendums have never been offered. ‘The Allies accept-
ed that the new country was a reality’ (Ibid.).
Despite the chronology depicting the opposite, even some ‘global intellectu-
als’ and academics, such as Michael Ignatieff, describe ‘the Kingdom of the Croats, 
Slovenes and Serbs [sic!] created after Versailles in 1918’ ignoring the fact that Ver-
sailles Peace Treaty and the preceding peace-talks in Paris took place in 1919 (Ig-
natieff, 2002: 62). Margaret MacMillan put it right in stating that ‘well before the 
Peace Conference opened, the South Slavs had taken matters into their own hands’ 
(MacMillan, 2001: 125). Eric Hobsbawm, as a careful historian, put the whole de-
bate into context of 1990s by stating that ‘the national conflicts tearing the continent 
apart in 1990s were the old chickens of Versailles once again coming home to roost’ 
(Hobsbawm, 1995: 31).
One should, however, consider the international factor in the creation of Yu-
goslavia. After all, international recognition followed the Versailles Treaty, many 
factual situations have been corrected by this treaty, and therefore it was of ultimate 
importance for the creators of the new state to get the approval of the Great Powers 
in Paris. This might seem to lead to the arguments of those who denied there was 
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a will among Slavs for the unification, but this is not the case. As Yugoslavia was 
not a creation of Versailles, it was also not ‘a creation of a historical dream, lasting 
result of historical tendencies and political will of the peoples’ as the other side usu-
ally argued in this debate that Lovrenović closely followed throughout the cultural 
space of South Slavs (Lovrenović, 2008). 
Vienna System of International Order: Pre-Yugoslav Period 
The argument stated here is that the creation, existence and the ultimate end of Yu-
goslavia were closely related to international relations and the rise, in particular, 
of the system of international interventionism and international humanitarian law. 
Thus the creation of the common South Slav state was a reflection of the change of 
international politics from the Vienna System to the Paris System. The change of 
the international system was noted also by historians like Hobsbawm who observed 
that ‘peace meant before 1914: after that came something that no longer deserved 
the name’ (Hobsbawm, 1995: 23). Eric D. Weitz sees a ‘tectonic shift in political 
conceptions and policies’ whereas ‘Vienna centred on dynastic legitimacy and state 
sovereignty within clearly defined borders’ while ‘Paris focused on populations 
and an ideal of state sovereignty rooted in national homogeneity’ (Weitz, 2008: 
1314). 
Başak Çali saw that ‘the Congress of Vienna in 1815 inaugurated not only a le-
gal regime, but a new political order that was based on the concept of the “balance 
of power”’ (Çali, 2010: 54). The balance was finally seriously disturbed a century 
later by the Slavs’ attempt in nation-state creation and led immediately to the global 
war. Mayer provided the comparative analysis: ‘The peacemakers of 1814-15 and 
1918-19 convened to settle the accounts of a multilateral, unlimited and ideological 
conflict; to legalise a new territorial status quo; to agree on safeguards and sanctions 
against future transgressions by the major defeated enemy; and to explore ways of 
putting the peace and concert of Europe on more enduring foundations’ (Mayer, 
1968: 3). Therefore an arguably decisive international element was to be found in 
the very roots of the South Slavs’ state creation in the 20th century. 
The roots of international humanitarian intervention, while not applicable to 
World War One, can be traced to the Balkans of the 19th century and the Vienna 
System. The ‘Concert of Europe’ that greatly served the interests of the great pow-
ers of the 19th century, brought them together against the ‘sick man of Asia’, as the 
Ottoman Empire was often described during this period, on more than one occasion. 
Greece in the first half of the century, Syria around the middle and the Slavs in 1878 
brought themselves to the attention of the Great Powers. Mass scale discrimina-
tion of the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire provoked reactions of leading 
European nations. It was ‘the result of entirely unanticipated events to which the 
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Great Powers were forced to react: peasant rebellions against Ottoman suzerainty in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, and Bulgaria; and the excessive ambitions of Russia 
in Southeastern Europe...’ (Weitz, 2008: 1319).
One should bear in mind some historical alliances and interests that some of the 
Great Powers expressed, regardless of the others, and pursued interventions indi-
vidually in the interest of one of the client nations. This is different from the emerg-
ing principle of international intervention, and during the 19th century, the two pro-
cesses paralleled each other. An article signed by ‘An Old Diplomatist’ in the North 
American Review, which was published immediately after the Berlin Congress, de-
scribed the behaviour of English and Russians at the time of the Serbian struggle 
against Ottomans: ‘although that principality was a part of Turkey, England made 
no remonstrance when Russian volunteers poured in to assist the Servians [sic!] in 
their war against Turkey, and supplied her armies with officers and munitions of 
war’ (Anonymous, 1878: 401).
Therefore this example is representative more of a realist approach to interna-
tional relations than the rising idea of liberal internationalism. The Congress of Ber-
lin connected the perceived internationalisation of roles and interests of the Great 
Powers, often proven in relation to Asian empires, and the rising polity of the sove-
reign nation-state. Berlin resulted in a somewhat restricted sovereignty, as the Great 
Powers ‘mandated religious freedom and civil and political rights for all citizens of 
the new Balkan states constituted by the treaty – Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, and 
Romania – and of the Ottoman Empire as well’ (Weitz, 2008: 1320).
The mandate over Bosnia-Herzegovina that was granted to Austria-Hungary 
in Berlin was an example of international intervention authorised, with the lack 
of organisations dedicated to global governance, by the powers belonging to the 
‘Concert of Europe’. A British traveller wrote at the time that ‘this insurrection – so 
pregnant in its consequences – was in its origins Agrarian rather than Political. It 
was largely an affair of tenant-right’ (Evans, 1877: 336). Although the mission was 
alleged to be of humanitarian character with the aim to prevent chaos and secure 
Christians, it was actually an expansion southwards by the central European empire. 
In Vienna, however, they did not see that ‘when Austria signed the Berlin Treaty 
she became a party to what, in all probability, will prove her own death-warrant’ 
(Anonymous, 1878: 397).
The Berlin Congress authorised the entrance of Austria-Hungary into Bosnia-
Herzegovina, while leaving official sovereignty with the Sultan in Constantino-
ple. The consequent rebellions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, primarily by local Muslims, 
were just a consequence of a game played at a ‘higher’ level between the Great 
Powers. By acting with the authorisation of the rest of the Great Powers, the rulers 
of the KundK monarchy also failed to notice Bismarck’s Machiavellian skills as he 
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‘has undoubtedly done all in his power to encourage Austria to enter the Slav trap 
prepared for her in Bosnia’ (Ibid.: 403). 
Smaller and newer states then adopted the position of clients in relation to the 
patrons among the Great Powers. While they achieved their independence with the 
help of their patrons, the relationship had not yet changed with the international re-
cognition of sovereignty. This was described in an article written at the time of the 
First Balkan Wars: ‘The international finger of warning was shaken vigorously in 
the faces of Bulgaria, Servia [sic!], Greece, and Montenegro’ (Tonjoroff, 1912: 721). 
The reality of these nations was given a more graphic description by naming them 
as ‘minor peoples, tugging at the leash in their desire to fly at the throat of their old 
oppressor, [who] were solemnly notified that under no circumstances would they be 
permitted to complicate the calculations of their betters by undertaking movements 
of their own, military or diplomatic’ (Ibid.). Thus, the whole region presented the 
leading powers with the opportunity to test some of the developing norms of interna-
tional relations and diplomacy. The Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 showed the expres-
sion of a need to shift from the Vienna System to the Paris System as smaller states 
did proceed with their intentions regardless of the warnings from the Great Powers. 
This was certainly part of the functioning Vienna System that was finally re-
placed after World War One. The Paris System ‘has partitioned territories along 
supposedly ethnic, national, and religious lines; legitimised forced deportations; 
consecrated civilisation and humanitarianism as express political goals; and moved 
the protection of rights from the purely national to the international level’ (Weitz, 
2008: 1314). This did not come on its own, but as the result of behind the scenes 
deals between the Great Powers. Mayer described that, ‘They arrogated to them-
selves the right to settle basic territorial, military, economic and political issues be-
fore securing approval for their decisions from the plenary congress or conference’, 
and put the others in a group of ‘the secondary and minor powers [who] were cast 
in the role of suitors, suppliants or satellites’ (Mayer, 1968: 3).
Yet Weitz clearly states that in the separation of periods there are signs of early 
internationalism that could be traced to the Balkans during the Vienna System. Thus 
an article in North American Review from the pre-World War I period described 
Macedonia in 1906 and international reactions when ‘the “concert” undertook what 
promised to be an effective attempt to postpone the crisis in the Balkans by intro-
ducing a programme of reforms in the disturbed vilayets under the supervision of a 
Europeanised gendarmerie and a European fiscal administration’ (Tonjoroff, 1912: 
724). 
Therefore, one might even argue that The Balkans, and Slavs in particular, 
have actually experienced a shift in international solutions to the problem, or an at-
tempt to change common practice, even earlier than the negotiations and agreement 
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of the Paris System. The entrance of Austria-Hungary into Bosnia-Herzegovina in 
1878, the postponement of the crisis by the introduction of European-led and ob-
served reform in Macedonia in 1906 and the role of the Great Powers in the Balkan 
Wars of 1912 and 1913 show the involvement, and, willingly or not, interest in Eu-
ropean capitals for the ‘Near East’. However, the Vienna System was still a domi-
nant arrangement and only a huge historical upheaval, such as the Great War, could 
dramatically change the relations between the powers and smaller nations. 
The changes, however, were gradual, as proven by the example of the concerns 
expressed at the crimes within the Ottoman Empire. One could see this develop-
ment as an organised struggle of Christian powers against a Muslim Empire, which 
the Ottoman Empire in its structured hierarchy certainly was. All the interventions 
during the Vienna System occurred after the systemic crimes against Christian sub-
jects of the Ottoman Empire. When the crimes reached genocidal levels, the lead-
ing powers, Britain, France and Russia, even coined a new term – Crimes against 
Christianity, but ‘later substituted “humanity” after considering the negative reac-
tion that such a specific term could elicit from Muslim populations in their colonies’ 
(Akcam, 2012). Geoffrey Robertson also stated this late change of terminology into 
crimes against humanity. Originally, Britain, France and Russia drafted a statement 
claiming liability of Ottoman leadership for ‘crimes committed by Turkey against 
Christianity and Civilization’ (Robertson, 2002: 17).
The principle of self-determination that was ignored at the Vienna Congress, as 
much as possible, entered the agenda at the Congress in Berlin in 1878. The interim 
period until the Paris Peace Talks in the first half of 1919 was marked by increased 
demands for the recognition of the right to self-determination and the resistance in 
the capitals of the Great Powers. Thus, it was not only in Paris that ‘the connection 
[was] drawn between populations conceived in national and racial terms and sove-
reignty, and the development of the civilising mission into a comprehensive program’ 
(Weitz, 2008: 1315). The issue that remained, however, was to determine which na-
tions ‘deserved’ the right to form a nation-state. The benefit of historical time differ-
ences provides us with the answer that European federations, Czechoslovakia, Yu-
goslavia and the Soviet Union did not pass the test of nation-building and ultimately 
proved the Peacemakers, as Margaret MacMillan called them, in Paris wrong (Mac-
Millan, 2001). It was too late for the creation of new nations in Europe. 
Therefore, the questions remaining were: which nations were to be granted a 
right to existence as holders of state sovereignty, and which nations were to be giv-
en the hardly privileged status of being minorities? The distinction required greater 
involvement, at least a promise of, by the remaining Great Powers in the system of 
protection of minorities. When this involvement failed to materialise, it led to gross 
human rights abuses. ‘It is this profound transformation that has led in the modern 
Croatian Political Science Review, Vol. 50, No. 5, 2013, pp. 54-73
60
era to both the great intensification of forced deportations (sometimes leading into 
genocides) and the concept and practice of minority rights (later leading into human 
rights)’ (Weitz, 2008: 1315).
Many authors viewed the dissolution of Yugoslavia and several forms of inter-
national interventions in the 1990s in the light of its origins. For Michael Ignatieff, 
it ‘represents the culmination of the failure of the previous attempts at unification 
of South Slavs... Both of these two previous attempts at state formation suppressed 
ethnic self-determination’ (Ignatieff, 2002: 62). The failure to uphold functioning 
international instruments to protect minorities in ‘created and failed’ nation-states 
inevitably recalled the very period of establishment of the Paris System. Thus Weitz 
claims that: ‘In the early 1990s, David Owen, and perhaps also Cyrus Vance and Ri-
chard Holbrooke, knew of the post-World War I population exchanges as they drew 
up their plans for partitioning Bosnia’ (Weitz, 2008: 1343).
Paris System of World Order: The First Yugoslavia 
Following the end of World War I, the Serbian army was actually invited to enter 
South Slav lands that were previously ruled by Austria-Hungary, due to unrest, lack 
of order and a power-vacuum, despite an attempt to create a state of Slovenes, Croats 
and Serbs in the former territories of Austria-Hungary. Thus, the entrance of the Ser-
bian army into Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia, could even be seen as a 
form of international intervention. It would not, however, be acceptable to the rest of 
the world had it not been sanctioned in some form by the leading powers, and prima-
rily by the newly installed dominating power, the United States of America. 
During the American neutrality in the war, President Woodrow Wilson en-
gaged in proposals aimed at ending the human catastrophes. In his correspondence 
to the American Ambassador to the United Kingdom, and ‘mutatis mutandis, to the 
American Diplomatic Representatives’ in ‘France, Italy, Japan, Russia, Belgium, 
Montenegro, Portugal, Romania, and Servia [sic!], and to all neutral Governments’ 
he stated the American interest ‘in the means to be adopted to relieve the smaller 
and weaker peoples of the world of the peril of wrong and violence is as quick and 
ardent as that of any other people or Government’ (Anonymous, 1917: 292). The 
French were quick in their reply, reminding the still neutral American government 
of ‘the horrors which accompanied the invasion of Belgium and of Servia [sic!]’, 
and that ‘the civilized world knows that they imply in all necessity and in the first 
instance the restoration of Belgium, of Servia [sic!], and of Montenegro’ (Ibid.: 
307). Thus, the future Yugoslavs were at the core of the exchange of ideas for the 
post-war settlement, and henceforth of the Paris System.
Providing a selective right to nation-state status has opened up numerous de-
bates since. For the case study of South Slavs, it led to several particular situations 
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that invoked some precedents in the international order. One might need to define 
briefly the nation in order to continue the discussion further. Considering various 
definitions, the significance for this study is in ‘large-scale, anonymous (rather than 
face-to-face) groups that have a common culture and character’ (Buchanan, 2007: 
380) with historical attachment to a particular territory and the membership in the 
group based on mutual recognition of belonging. Hobsbawm saw nations as a myth, 
claiming that it was nationalism that ‘takes pre-existing cultures and turns them 
into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures’ 
(Hobsbawm, 1990: 10). 
Which of the South Slavs qualified for a nation in 1919 under this definition 
might add to the debate, but the importance for this study is in pre-war statehood 
of Serbia and Montenegro and various degrees of local autonomy, or separateness, 
recognised for Slavs within Austria-Hungary. The interests of many South Slavs led 
to the creation of the common state, but international circumstances also dictated 
this option as the most acceptable at the time. Serbia, as part of the victorious alli-
ance, and specifically mentioned in Wilson’s Fourteen Points Speech, thus gained 
access to the sea, while Croats, Slovenes, Bosnians, Herzegovinians and indeed 
many Serbs living in former Austrian territories, were given their own state, albeit 
together with Serbians and Montenegrins. 
This certainly left many dissatisfied with the Paris System on all sides. The 
more extreme cases of disaffected groups involved those who organised themselves 
for terrorist actions against the new state. Croat nationalists created an organisation 
of Ustashas that carried out the assassination of the Yugoslav King Aleksandar and 
French Foreign Minister Louis Barthou in Marseille in 1934. Historical evidence 
proved they were supported by Mussolini’s Italy in many ways, but the Yugoslavs 
complained to the League of Nations against Hungary. They ‘specifically accused 
Hungary of complicity in the crime, and asked the League to investigate “this situ-
ation, which seriously compromises relations between Yugoslavia and Hungary...”’ 
(Kuhn, 1935: 88). Czechoslovakia and Romania, Yugoslav Central European allies, 
joined the complaint urging the League of Nations to act and preserve the peace in 
this region. Even the accused Hungarians drew upon preservation of peace ‘empha-
sizing that delay would be dangerous because the political atmosphere thus created 
was “capable of affecting even the peace of the world”’, while maintaining ‘Hun-
gary had merely granted a right of asylum to refugees’ (Kuhn, 1935: 89). Another 
article at the time claimed Alexander’s death was ‘loss to Europe and humanity at 
large’ (Balkanicus, 1934: 219).
Thus the League of Nations had to get involved in preservation of ‘peace of 
the world’ by debating international legal possibilities for solving the crisis. The 
organisation is often viewed as ‘the first major attempt to coordinate the behaviour 
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of states through an international actor that possessed its own legal personality and 
staff and set as its goal the advancement of international peace and security as op-
posed to the interests of individual member states’ (Çali, 2010: 57).
Kuhn, in his analysis, recalled Vattel’s view: ‘If a sovereign who has the power 
to see that his subjects act in a just manner permits them to injure a foreign nation, 
either the state itself or its citizens, he does no less a wrong to that nation than if he 
injured it himself’ (Kuhn, 1935: 89). As highlighted by Hungary, the post-war set-
tlement clearly created large groups of dissatisfied, minorities and refugees. Yugo-
slavia, however, questioned the nature of ‘those terrorist elements which had taken 
refuge in Hungary and which have continued to enjoy the same connivance in that 
country as previously, and it is only thanks to this connivance that the odious Mar-
seille outrage could have been perpetrated’ (Ibid.: 90).
The assassination of Austrian Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914 left 
Austria-Hungary with no global institution to complain to. The complaint by Yugo-
slavia in 1934 was heard and dealt with by the League of Nations. Thus, the 1914 
assassination led to the war, while neither the murder of Alexander in 1934 nor any 
other political assassination in the inter-war period led to the second global conflict. 
Although the League of Nations might be described as a failure in preserving inter-
national peace, it did act on this occasion in order to preserve it, and consequent-
ly created some precedents. The resolution that was adopted unanimously stated: 
‘That it is the duty of every State neither to encourage nor tolerate on its territory 
any terrorist activity with a political purpose; That every State must do all in its 
power to prevent and repress acts of this nature and must for this purpose lend its 
assistance to governments which request it’ (Ibid.: 91).
The League set up a committee with the aim to draft a convention to secure the 
repression of conspiracies with political and terrorist aims. Even the French idea of 
setting up a ‘Permanent International Penal Court’ was discussed by this commit-
tee. Robertson states that by 1937 they managed to draft convention for the creation 
of an ‘International Criminal Court with jurisdiction to try terrorist offences but it 
failed to attract many signatories before most of its members slid into another world 
war’ (Robertson, 2002: 227).
Cold War: The Second Yugoslavia
The end of the war resulted in significant changes in international relations, espe-
cially with regards to issues of international interventionism. Prior to World War 
II, as Scheffer stated, ‘unilateral military intervention for strictly humanitarian pur-
poses was regarded as legitimate by a large community of international law schol-
ars’ (Scheffer, 1992: 258). The establishment of the United Nations with the Char-
ter explicitly prohibiting use of force except in self-defence or by the approval of 
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the Security Council meant a completely different period began in 1945, and by 
coinciding with the Cold War, pushed the issue of interventionism outside of main-
stream debates. 
The bipolar world, balance of powers and the establishment of the Movement 
of Non-Aligned Countries meant that the second Yugoslavia was secure in its ex-
istence. Domestic politics were controlled and prevented any threats to its stability, 
while international situations kept both superpowers off the limits of the state. Thus, 
the irony is that the period of stagnation in the development of the idea of interna-
tional humanitarian intervention actually created the period of the greatest prosper-
ity and stability for Yugoslavia. 
It was only with the end of the Cold War that the attitude towards international 
interventions changed in many leading nations, while internal interethnic difficul-
ties in Yugoslavia led to a series of wars of Yugoslav succession. ‘The end of the 
Cold War’, Çali noted, ‘saw the United Nations collective security system enter a 
new phase’ (Çali, 2010: 225).
The wars of 1990s provided an opportunity to check whether the new world 
order was capable of reducing the misery of people by strong military action that 
would ignore sovereignty of the state. Some additional factors also contributed to 
the changed circumstances. Technological developments meant media could report 
live from almost anywhere in the world, and when a capital city came under siege 
in Europe, it was too big of a challenge and too ‘good’ a news story to be ignored 
by all global media. Thus, reports on daily suffering of Sarajevo citizens meant 
that citizens in liberal democracies increasingly urged their leaders to stop the war 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina. David Scheffer, who was American Ambassador at Large 
for War Crimes in Clinton’s administration, wrote just prior to the war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina: ‘To argue today that the norms of sovereignty, non-use of force, and 
the sanctity of internal affairs are paramount to the collective human rights of peo-
ple, whose lives and well-being is at risk, is to avoid the hard questions of interna-
tional law and to ignore the march of history’ (Scheffer, 1992: 259).
The principle of non-changing European borders was broken by the unification 
of Germany and sent a clear signal to various leaders in Yugoslavia. The country 
soon descended into a series of ethnic wars and offered a flash dilemma of an inter-
vention on behalf of humanity, or respecting the principle of state sovereignty. The 
West was confronted with the question, as Buchanan put it, whether ‘proclaiming 
the conflict to be an internal dispute protected from intervention by the veil of Yu-
goslav state sovereignty and attempting to constrain what soon came to be seen as 
the inevitable process of disintegration’ (Buchanan, 2007: 340), because in his view 
‘Yugoslavia broke down before it broke up’ (Ibid.: 366).
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Uni-polar System: The Post-Yugoslav Wars
This development of the early 1990s offered the dilemma of the right of the interna-
tional community to intervene into a sovereign state’s territories in order to protect 
civilians or to continue the Cold War practice of non-intervention. The change in the 
White House is of great importance for the global change in the policies of interven-
tionism. The two processes coincided with the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which 
offered a fresh challenge and sought a solution. The developments were gradual, 
as many resisted the idea of intervening after the setback in Somalia. Through the 
media pressure, however, liberal intellectuals globally and new politicians in power 
came to the conclusion that the war and the siege had to be stopped. Nonetheless, it 
still took them three years to execute this move. Numerous resolutions were adopt-
ed by the United Nations Security Council over this period and changed little in 
practice. The gap between bureaucratic wording in the Security Council and actual 
action remained, in practice, but the level of verbal threat of using military action 
increased. 
The slow changes and slowness of the UN apparatus is reflected in the case of 
Srebrenica. Military campaigns by Bosnian Serbs in 1992 ethnically cleansed most 
of eastern Bosnia and forced some 100,000 Bosnian Muslims into the small town. 
The Security Council passed Resolution 819 on April 16th 1993 and the town it-
self was overrun by Bosnian Serbs’ forces in July 1995 to be followed by the exe-
cution of some 8,000 Bosnian Muslims. The International Court of Justice named 
this act as genocide in its judgement and in a consequent explanatory statement on 
February 26, 2007 (ICJ, 2007). ‘This is the first legal case in which allegations of 
genocide have been made by one State against another’ (Ibid.), said the statement 
by the Court as Bosnia-Herzegovina accused Serbia of committing genocide. ‘The 
Court found that there was conclusive evidence that killings and acts causing seri-
ous bodily or mental harm targeting the Bosnian Muslims took place in Srebrenica 
in July 1995’ (Ibid.). The Court, however, also found that it was not another state, 
i.e., Serbia, that controlled the forces of the Bosnian Serbs Army that committed 
the genocide. 
The aim of this paper, however, is to focus on the changes in general attitude 
towards international intervention which indeed have followed the genocide in Sre-
brenica. ‘The tragedy of Srebrenica will haunt our history forever’, then Secretary-
General Kofi Annan wrote in a 1999 review of the UN’s failure to protect the people 
of Srebrenica. ‘Through error, misjudgement and inability to recognise the scope 
of evil confronting us, we failed to do our part to save the people of Srebrenica’ 
(Lynch, 2010).
The power, or lack of it, of the UN was exercised in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
by NATO, who ‘enforced the UN Security Council’s No-Fly Zone over Bosnia’ 
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(NATO, 2009). It was by imposing the ‘Operation Deny Flight’ that NATO got in-
volved in the first ever combat mission when they ‘shot down four Bosnian Serb 
fighter-bombers conducting a bombing mission in violation of the No-Fly Zone’ 
(Ibid.). ‘NATO fighters, acting in accordance with the established procedure, shot 
down four of six jets in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina which had defied 
the international ban on military flights and ignored two warnings by the NATO 
fighters’ (UN, 1996).
Another precedent came when they effectively imposed the end to atrocities 
and the siege of Sarajevo. ‘After a mortar attack caused a heavy loss of life at a mar-
ketplace in Sarajevo, UN peacekeepers requested NATO airstrikes, which began 
on 30 August against Bosnian Serb air defences (Operation DEADEYE)’ (NATO, 
2009). After a five day pause and the Bosnian Serbs’ failure to comply with the 
demands to withdraw, NATO conducted the action Deliberate Force that ‘targeted 
Bosnian Serb command & control installations and ammunition facilities. These 
airstrikes were a key factor in bringing the Serbs to the negotiating table and ending 
the war in Bosnia’ (Ibid.).
Prior to the decisive action in the summer of 1995, the UN system kept attempt-
ing to solve the problem in a traditional manner, as stated by the UN themselves: ‘In 
a series of resolutions and statements, the Security Council appealed to all parties 
to bring about a cease-fire and a negotiated political solution, and demanded, inter 
alia, that all forms of interference from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina, including 
by JNA, as well as by the Croatian Army, cease immediately and that all local irre-
gular forces be disbanded and disarmed’ (UN, 1996). This resolution, like numerous 
others, proved to be of very little assistance in ending the conflict. 
One development was crucial in the later precedent when the UN used NATO to 
intervene violently in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The session of 7th January 1994 of ‘The 
[Security] Council reaffirmed its commitment to implement all its relevant resolu-
tions, in particular resolution 836 (1993), by which it had authorised UNPROFOR 
to use force to protect Sarajevo and five towns previously declared “safe areas” in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (Ibid.). Just a few days later, ‘the Heads of State and Go-
vernment participating’ at the NATO meeting ‘reaffirmed their readiness under the 
authority of the Security Council “to carry out air strikes in order to prevent the stran-
gulation of Sarajevo, the safe areas and other threatened areas in Bosnia and Herze-
govina”’ (Ibid.).
A series of similar developments in New York and Brussels effectively changed 
the role of the UN forces because it meant they ‘could launch offensive action 
against Bosnian Serb elements’, while during the first 22 months of the war, the UN 
‘had previously been allowed to use air support only in defence of United Nations 
personnel’ (Ibid.). This was a crucial change for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Firstly, it pro-
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vided grounds for the first combat action carried out by NATO and consequently 
prepared legal grounds by the Security Council for authorisation of the use of of-
fensive action. 
Operation Deny Flight was replaced by operations Deadeye and Deliberate 
Force in August and September 1995. The two actions taken against Bosnian Serbs, 
led by the NATO forces on behalf of the UN and under the authorisation of previ-
ously adopted Security Council resolutions, ended the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
It was the precedent that marked the change of understanding of the role of interna-
tional community in the conflict following the end of the Cold War. Even more, the 
German Luftwaffe participated, which was ‘the first time German forces have been 
deployed in Europe outside Germany since 1945’ (The Independent, 1995). 
Thus, Bosnia-Herzegovina provided an example of legal ‘humanitarian inter-
vention’ where the global organisation – the United Nations – put the most power-
ful military organisation – NATO – into use. There were, as always, those who op-
posed such actions, but the voting in the Security Council showed no votes against 
the action in Bosnia-Herzegovina. When it came to Kosovo in 1999, the situation 
was very different. It is essential to recall the definition of ‘humanitarian interven-
tion’ as the ‘threat or use of armed force by a state, a belligerent community, or an 
international organisation, with the object of protecting human rights’, according to 
Brownie (1974: 217).The objections with regards to Kosovo came from China and 
Russia which effectively blocked the Security Council resolution. Therefore, the le-
gality of military action by NATO against The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, by 
then consisting of Serbia and Montenegro, has been questioned and debated ever 
since, because ‘intervention without UNSC authority remained controversial’ (Bel-
lamy & Wheeler, 2008: 524). Antonio Cassese, the first President of the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia, noted that ‘in the present instance, 
the member states of NATO have not put forward any legal justification based on 
the United Nations Charter’ (Zolo, 2002: 71).
Following the intervention, Kofi Annan ‘declared that there was a “developing 
international norm” to forcibly protect civilians who were at risk from genocide and 
mass killing’ (Bellamy & Wheeler, 2008: 524). However, many ‘have rejected the 
idea that international law permits humanitarian intervention without the authorisa-
tion of the Security Council’, as was the case over Kosovo (Brown, 2000: 1701). 
Even if one looks at the very roots of the conflict in Kosovo, there are opposing 
opinions, as Buchanan found: ‘There is no doubt that Serbia, under Milosevic’s lead-
ership, unilaterally revoked Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989. But there is dispute about 
who violated the terms of the autonomy agreement first’ (Buchanan, 2007: 358). 
Other authors saw that ‘NATO was propelled into action by a mixture of hu-
manitarian concern and self-interest’ (Bellamy & Wheeler, 2008: 529). The motives 
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of the USA, without which there was no successful intervention in recent times, are 
also questioned, because the advocates of interventionism ‘usually concede that the 
United States’ safety was never directly threatened by the crises there’ (Valentino, 
2011: 72). However, other authors saw ‘the United States and its allies, as wealthy 
and powerful states, have a lot to lose from instability and chaos in the international 
system’ (Brown, 2000: 1710). American President Bill Clinton justified the action to 
the nation: ‘By acting now we are upholding our values, protecting our interests and 
advancing the cause of peace’, said the President on the eve of strikes, adding: ‘We 
learned some of the same lessons in Bosnia just a few years ago’ (Clinton, 1999).
Legality remains the issue, because, as Zolo strongly put it, ‘the armed attack 
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, a sovereign state and a member of the 
United Nations, was a pure and simple act of aggression, a most serious breach of 
current international law, against which the Security Council had the duty to inter-
vene on the authority of Articles 2, 39, 41 and 42 of the United Nations Charter, us-
ing military force, if necessary, to assist the state attacked’ (Zolo, 2002: 72).
There were also inevitable comparisons of victims in Kosovo, Bosnia-Herze-
govina, Rwanda and elsewhere with victims of the Holocaust. While the comparison 
stands with regards to innocent victims, there is a main objection of who is bene-
fiting from the interventions at the end of the twentieth century. Valentino saw ‘the 
choice to aid these groups also entailed supporting the less than upstanding armed 
factions on their side’ (Valentino, 2011: 63). The legality, if not legitimacy, of the 
intervention against primarily Serbia, as Montenegro was considered less of a prob-
lem to the solution of Kosovo, was questioned in many forums: ‘Military action to 
aid the Kosovar Albanians was the right thing to do, but it is unacceptable that no 
clear legal justification for that operation has been offered’ (Brown, 2000: 1690).
Another view compared the horrors of WWII and Yugoslavia yet again: ‘Eu-
rope and the United States had a moral, even more than a legal, right to prevent a 
revival of the horrible crimes of World War II – mass deportation, rape, terrorism, 
genocide – in former Yugoslavia’ (Zolo, 2002: 66). In doing so, however, NATO 
was subject to unprecedented public scrutiny. ‘Human Rights Watch estimates that 
NATO air strikes killed more than 500 civilians... These and other incidents led Hu-
man Rights Watch to conclude that NATO had violated international humanitarian 
law in its conduct of the war. Amnesty International accused NATO of war crimes’ 
(Valentino, 2011: 64). Many academics added their concerns to those of internation-
al NGOs: ‘The principal issue of international humanitarian law raised by the recent 
NATO military action against Yugoslavia concerns collateral damage to civilians 
and their interests’ (Brown, 2000: 1731).
It was already observed that ‘the 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia was not a 
typical armed confrontation, and it has raised a challenging set of legal issues’ (Ibid.: 
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1684). Greenwood, while justifying the causes for action, joined the critical voices: 
‘The military response by NATO, however, aroused more controversy than any use 
of force since the end of the cold war’ (Greenwood, 2002: 143). Brown adds to the 
debate with the note that ‘the NATO operation on behalf of the Kosovar Albanians 
seems to represent a prima facie violation of the U.N. Charter’s rules on the use of 
force’ (Brown, 2000: 1739). Greenwood claims ‘modern customary international 
law recognizes a right of military intervention on humanitarian grounds by States 
or by an organization like NATO’ (Greenwood, 2002: 170). ‘On balance’, Geoffrey 
Robertson concludes, ‘Kosovo was a just and lawful war, and the victims of Serbia’s 
crimes against humanity are better off as a result of it’ (Robertson, 2002: 451). 
Zolo, however, points to the precedent: ‘In previous cases, countries promoting 
military interventions had sought to justify their decision by appealing to interna-
tional law and soliciting and in one way or another obtaining a posteriori the ap-
proval of the Security Council of the United Nations. In the case of war for Kosovo, 
NATO instead first threatened to use force and then actually did so without even 
beginning to go through the formalities required to obtain an authorisation from the 
Security Council’ (Zolo, 2002: 69). ‘This is a just war, based not on any territorial 
ambitions but on values’, stated British Prime Minister Tony Blair and pointed to 
history: ‘We have learned twice before in this century that appeasement does not 
work. If we let an evil dictator range unchallenged, we will have to spill infinitely 
more blood and treasure to stop him later’ (Blair, 1999). The Czech President Vac-
lav Havel offered the justification: ‘This did not happen irresponsibly, as an act of 
aggression or out of disrespect for international law ... The alliance has acted out 
of respect for human rights, as both conscience and international legal documents 
dictate’ (Havel, 1999).
Yet, it is a problem to interpret the UN Charter as it allowed for the military 
intervention over Kosovo. The Security Council resolution was impossible to be 
adopted even a month earlier in the case of extension of the UN mandate in neigh-
boring Macedonia because China used its veto ‘to block renewal of the mandate in 
protest at Macedonian links with Taiwan’ (Greenwood, 2002: 151). Legal justifica-
tion was impossible because of geopolitical interests of the Great Powers that the 
case of China blocking mandate in Macedonia ‘graphically illustrated the difficul-
ties which would be faced if NATO sought authorization for action from the Secu-
rity Council in the Kosovo crisis’(Greenwood, 2002: 151). NATO simply bypassed 
the UN system and reached an agreement with the Macedonian government. In 
March 1999, NATO also ignored the UN and international system and launched the 
humanitarian intervention over Kosovo. As Zolo stated, ‘NATO has simply ignored 
provisions of the United Nations Charter’ (Zolo, 2002: 70).
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Contemporary World: Conclusion
The precedents have been set in Yugoslavia for later actions across the globe. Firstly 
the founding of the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia created a 
precedent. This tribunal set up by the United Nations was the first attempt at bring-
ing the war criminals to international justice since the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials 
in 1940s. On May 25, 1993, the UN Security Council passed resolution 827 for-
mally establishing the Tribunal. This was followed by the establishment of a similar 
court for Rwanda, then a hybrid court for Sierra Leone and several other nationally 
or regionally restricted courts. Finally, the International Criminal Court was set up 
by the Rome Agreement in 1998 and the ratification of the agreement by the 60th 
state in 2002, when it came into existence. This was the first globally important 
precedent coming out of the former Yugoslavia.
Another important precedent was the result of the League of Nations resolution 
that stated ‘that it is the duty of every State neither to encourage nor tolerate on its 
territory any terrorist activity with a political purpose...’ (Kuhn, 1935: 91). This act 
was followed by the attempts to establish an international criminal tribunal, but the 
initiative was prevented by World War II.
The end of the state of Yugoslavia provided global precedents in the field of 
international justice and also for humanitarian intervention. Bosnia-Herzegovina 
throughout the first half of 1990s was the case of the Security Council’s resolution 
that gradually led to the NATO-led military involvement, and finally to the humani-
tarian intervention in 1995 that ended the four year war. A year earlier, it provided 
the grounds for the first military combat of NATO troops in its history. The pre-
cedent was also set for the involvement of German military outside of the country 
for the first time since the end of WWII. The case of Bosnia-Herzegovina provides 
a perfect case of the post-Cold War international humanitarian intervention that was 
legal due to the Security Council resolutions. The intervention that commenced in 
Afghanistan in 2001 is partly based on the legal precedents of the League of Nations 
resolution from 1934 and the United Nations intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
in 1995.
Kosovo provided another example of a precedent when there was a NATO hu-
manitarian intervention carried out without the approval of the Security Council of 
the United Nations. Geoffrey Robertson supported the intervention by stating ‘there 
is no court as yet to stop a state which murders and extirpates its own people for 
them, if the Security Council fails to reach superpower agreement, the only salva-
tion can come through other states exercising the right of humanitarian intervention. 
Thanks to Kosovo, that right has re-entered international law...’ (Robertson, 2002: 
448). Another example from the former Yugoslavia provided NATO with a challenge 
after China blocked the renewal of the UN mandate in Macedonia only for NATO 
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to reach a separate agreement with the government in Skopje. Thus a precedent has 
been set – there was no need for Security Council approval of international engage-
ment in preserving peace and security. This has been used in Iraq in 2003, when even 
NATO members were divided, and therefore a ‘Coalition of the Willing’ was formed 
by the Americans. By then, the leftovers of Yugoslavia began their separate lives and 
the development of the instruments of international humanitarian intervention was 
shaped, as demonstrated in the cases of Libya and Syria. There is no rule and the na-
tions’ destinies are dependent on the Great Powers’ interests. 
The first Prosecutor at the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugosla-
via, Richard Goldstone, who also chaired the International Commission on Kosovo, 
concluded: ‘We came to a unanimous conclusion – I suppose an oxymoron – that 
the NATO intervention was illegal but legitimate’ (New Statesmen, 2009). Some le-
gal experts supported Russia’s failed attempt to secure support for the resolution to 
condemn the NATO intervention. Others observed ‘the justification for the NATO 
bombing campaign, acting out of area and without UN authorisation, in support of 
the repressed ethnic Albanian population of that province of Yugoslavia, was that of 
humanitarian necessity’ (Shaw, 2008: 1156).
Goldstone connected the developments and the consequent debate to the lat-
est development in the field of international humanitarian intervention: ‘It was an 
after-the-fact acceptance of what happened. That led to the Canadian inquiry, which 
developed into the “Responsibility to Protect” doctrine, which has in turn become 
soft law’ (New Statesmen, 2009). One might argue that without the violent collapse 
of the Yugoslav state and consequent international developments, without the un-
precedented developments during the existence of this state, and finally without the 
changes in global order, there would be no strong steps taken towards a new doc-
trine of responsibility to protect, one that has not yet become a norm, but is consi-
dered more seriously than ever before. Kofi Annan said in the United Nations that 
there was responsibility to protect innocent civilians and ‘history will judge us very 
harshly if we let ourselves be deflected in this task, or think we are excused from it, 
by invocations of national sovereignty’ (Annan, 2004).
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